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SUMMARY
Economic and Monetary Union is a further step in the ongoing prccess of European
economic integration.  In this respect, ir is also part of the wider integration  in the global
economy. EMU will cnable thc Europcan  Union to mect thc challenges of globdisation.
While EMU implies ar economic policy regime change primarily for thc participating
countries, it will also have imlortant  e)deNnal implications. EMU will creatc an arc.a
whose economic  potantial will be comparable to that of the United Statcs. Sructnral
changes will occur primarily in financial markets.  The present segmcntation will be
overcome in many respects and the Europcan ftnancial market will become truly
integrated. The implied grcater competition beturcen banks and financial systcms in
gencral will lead ro efflrciency gains in tscrs of resource  allocation  and ultimately
stimulate  investment and job creation.
Qiven the size of the euro area, it is to bc expeaed that the euro will play an important
role as an internarional  currency. As a trade invoicing currencyr the euro will extend its
role bcyond dircct trade relations.  Given the stability oriented policy of the ECB and
Member State fiscal policies aimed at sorurd public finances, the euro will play an
important role in financial portfolio's  uorld-widg and as a mqior res€rve qurency.
The development of the eruo into a mdjor internstional curency will bc gradual, but
rclativcly important in those countries, which have close tinks with the EMU
participating corutries.  Some effects will become observable Evcn before EMU starts.
Therefore, a carefirl preparation of thc changeover is of paramount  importance in order to
reducc transitional rrncertainties.  Thc durabilrty of convergcncc in the cruo arca will
increase the confidence in the stability oricnted policy of the ECB and should therefore
reduce any risk prernium initiaily attachcd to the curo. This will faciliatc  thc ECB's task
in pursuing  a stability oricntcd policy. Spcculation on possiblc cf[ccts arising from cxcess
dollar rsscrycs i5 not fowrdcd. Morcovcr, shifts in privatc portfolios arc vcry difficult to
asecrtain as thcre are faclors which work in oppositc directions,  thus largcly balancing
out net effects.
The long-term trend of the euro depends on both domestic and foreign economic
developments  and policies. However, the design of econonric policy malcing in EMU
will srengthen the Enropean  economy since it will encoruage a balanced policy mix wittt
low interest rates, The euro will be a soong arrd stable crnrensy in the long term.While
the exchange rare policy of the euro will be subordinated  to the price stability objective,
the ECB would respond to e:<tqnal dcrrelopments  taking the intcrests of the EMU as a
whole into account
EMU will trave implications for the EU's relationship with internatiooat ittttitttions with
responsibility for improving the stability of the intcrnational  monctary  syst€m. Although
the most likely sceriario is that the ourrcnt managcd floating system wiU be maintainFd,
EMU should inqeasc thc symnretry in the intcmational moneEry system, thereby
cnhancing the bcnefits and allowing for a more efficient distibution of the benefits
derived from internarional economic coordination.  It will have also implicatiors for the
clcANoo1o321--10 @ ors
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operation of intemational instinrtions,  e.g. for the economic surveillance carried out by
the IMF, The euro will thus be the opporurdty to strengthen the effectiveness  of
economic policy co-ordination, contibuting  to grcater exchange rate stability
INTRODUCTION
The launching of the third stage of EMU and the intoduction of the euro will
replesent a firrther step in the process of economic integration  within the Eruopean
Union- The effects will be felt primarily in the Member States participating in the
euro area. The conduct of a single monetary policy will by itself imply a regime
change for these Mernber States, but will also require erftanced co{dination in
other areas of economic policy-
Given the economic importance of the euro area - whatever its initial size - the
intoduction of the eruo will also have significant  effects on Member States outside
of the area as well as on courtries outside of the Eruopean  Uniou. These so-called
extemal  aspecs of the euro are the subject of increasing discussion in international
fora. The OECD, the IMF and the Monetary  Committee  have all devoted time to
these external aspects- This document dra\vs on discussions  in thcse fora in
attempting  to provide some economic analysis of the likely impacl of the euro on
developments in the intemational  economy an4 more specifically, in tbe
international  monetary system. While the analysis will explore the main issues, it is
not the intention to reach firm conclusions at this stage but ratlrer to stimulate the
debate.
From the debate so far, the relevant analytical framework for assessing the orrcmal
effects of the euro is fairly straightforrrrard. Nevertheless, e)@ct quantification  of
these effects will not be possible. Firstly, many of the effects will be felt only
gradually and will depend upon private sector expecations,  while othcr effects will
already be fe.lt before the euro is intoduced. Secondly,  sorte of the cffccts will work
in opposite directions.  Thus, for example, the evolution of the euro qchange rate
relative to other inrcrnationd currencies cannot be determined ex ante. Tbirdly, by
definition,  the exrcrnal effects of thc ewo will not only depend upon rhc economic
policies and performance in the erro area but also on thosc of partner coufiries.
Nevertheless, it is clear that a smoothly fixrctioning EMU will be of paramount
importancc in asstuing  that thc ext€mal cffecs of the curo arc beneficial.
This document  presents a first analysis of tlre extcrnal aspccts of thc euro. It is
strnctured as follows. Section A sets out some eeonomic indicators in order to
evaluate the weight of the euro-af,ca  in the norld economy, particularly  relative to
that of thc Unircd States and Japan. It will be shown that in many rcspects the euro-
area would devclop - over timc - an economic weighr similar to rhar of rhe Unired
States. For simplicigr, we will assume in the remainder of the analysis  that the curo-
area comprises the entire European Union so as to avoid any presumptions
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development of the euro as an intcmational currency : as a means of paymeot  as a
trnit of accoutt and as a rcserve cqrency, comp3red to the prqsent situation.
Sections B and C discuss the implications of the changed policy framework of the
euro area. Section B analyses a number of uansitional issues associated with the
intoduction of the single curreacy, in particular the likely currency rtovements.
Section C examines lotrg-terrn a{rects, and anemps to draw some couclusions on
the likely behaviour of the euro given the different environment in which morctary
and fiscal policy will be operating. It also describes the institrrtional  &amework for
the exchange rate policy of the area relative to non-EU cunencies, as establistrcd  in
Article 109 of the Treaty. Finally, Section D analyses the cousequences  of EMU for
international  economic coordination. It sets out the institutional aspecb which arise,
particularly in the area of economic co-operation and suneillance and involving.the
IMF, the euro-area participants and the Commrurity institutions.
TI{E EURO AREA IN TIIE WORLD ECONOIVfY. SOME STRUCTURAL
NI}ICATORS
Principal  chsracte ristics of the euro area
An EMU of 15 Menber States will bave thc following main ctraracrcristics (see
Annex l):
lts economic and commercial  weight will be comparable  to that of the United States
and larger than that of Japan. In 1996 tre European Union's share of the GDP in the
OECD amounted ta 38.3yo, as agains 32-5% for the United Sntes and 20.5% for
Japan. If intra-Commumty  trade is excludcd, the Er:ropean Union accounts for
2O-9% of world uadc, as comparcd with 19.6% for thc United States and 10.5% for
Japan.
fite anterage degree of openness of the Member States of the Ertropean  Union (as
measured by the sharc of o<ports in GDP) is currently 29.tyo, compared  with 8.2%
for the United States at;d 9oh for Japan. Thc degree of openness of some
Member  Starcs is higher, risiag to more t}ran 6V/o in the case of Belgium  and
Ireland. If intra-Commwrity  trade is o<cludcd, the degrec of operutess of thc euro
area is l0.2yo, similar to that of ths Unitcd States and Japan.
Due largely to a convergeoce  of ecouomic policy objectives, the economic cycles in
the different Member States have over the last ten years becomc morc synchronised.
This uend will be reinforced in EMU owing to thc implcmentation of a single
monemry and exchango'rete policy, the increase in economic interdependencc and
the likely inrcnsification  of economic-policy coordination, Tltis greater cyclical
synchronization,  combined wirh rhe size of EMU, will make economic developmcnts
in the euro ar€a more imnortant  to the rrorld. .
clcANeoroJzr--10 @otz
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The economic perfonnanc€  of euro area will be less sensittve to *changc-rate
fluctuations.  This reduccd rnrlnerability will result from the disappearance of strains
bctween European currcncies that can stem from fluchrations in the currenoies of
third coruruies or shocks outside the Eruopean Union. For exanple, thc weakness of
the dollar at the begiming of 1995 crcated stains in the EMS by reinforcing the
German mark's role as a safe haven. The implied exchange-rate  variability within
the single market which reduced consumer and investor  confidence, will disappear
with the euro's arrival
Euro linancial market
EMU will create one of the largest goverDment  bond markets in thc world' This
market can be expected to develop rapidly. From the beginning  of EMU' all new
issues of govemment bonds will be in euro- flswevetr,  European  financid markets
and therefore government  bond markets can be expected to retain a number of
country-specific  characteristics  for arr interim period at least. This phenomanon will
not be primarily due to transaction costs but to differences in tan treatnents and a
wide range of financial and monetary rules and insrruments. EMU will diminish a
number of these elements. The European financial market will become trrly
integrated  .rs e.g.:
-  the development of an effrcient trans-border paymeflt system. will corurcct the
existing financial cenres (i.c. Target: Trans Eumpcan Automated  Real-Timc  Crross
settlement Express Transfer system);
-  the harmonization  of financial instnrments will imply convcrgcncc towards thc most
eflicient  means of finarrcing;
-  a single monetary policy - implying a lnified money market - will intensiff
competition  between banks and non-bank financial  intermediaries:
-  and finally, exchange rate risk between the participating  countries will be eliminated.
There will be no.single  sovereign borrower  on the euro uarkets as in tlie case of the
Treasury in thc Unitcd Statcs. Thc yicld on coEssponding  government bonds in
Mernbcr States participating in the q,tro are:r uny not canverge complctely.  Yield
differences which will reflect the market's assessment of default risk, are likely to be
srnall given nominal oonv€rgence required on enEy and the commiuncnt to avoid
excessive  public sector deficis thereafter. Since the lenel of liquidity of the leading
euo debt markets will be higher, a rqduction in the liquidity premium incorporated
in nominal  interest rates could occur.
Internationalization  of the euro
A iurrency develops at international  level whcn its rse ortends beyond the frontiers
of the issuing country and when it is used by private and official operators  as a
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means of payment, a unit of account  and a storc of value. Various factors (e.g. the
size of EMIJ, rhe sability orienrcd policy-mix and the wide financial rnarket
underpinning it) should facilitate the development of the internartonat use of the
euro.'Ihe behaviour of privarc operators, hourevetr, will be ihe most importanr factor.
The use of the euro in an area whose economic  and commercial weight will be
equivalent to that of the United States should reduce the inforrration  and transaction
costs associated with its use. companies which trade principally with the
European  Union will be prompted to invoice and pay in euros. With the euro being
widely used ia international tade uansactions, European exporte,rs and importers
will no longer have to carry excbange-rate  risks or cover themselves against zuch.
risks. The euro could also be used as a vehicular currency in com.rrercial  transagtions
not involving  member counFics of EMU. For example, if use of the euro were
equivalcnt  simply to that of thc German mark today (sec Annecc 2, Table 2),30Yo of
world exports rvould be invoiccd in eruos following the ctrangeover to EMU.
Similarly,  the simple conversion of ocsets currently held in European  crrnencies into
euros will mean that more than a third of the world portfotio will be denominated in
euros, a percen?2ge equivalent to that of the dollar.
Other characreristics of the euno area should also prorroe ttre international
development of the euro beyond that currently applicable to the German mark.
Stability oriented monetary  and fiscal policies and the ECB's independence  should
makc the euro a stable curency, protccting  holders of euro-deoominatcd asscts &om
losses in pruchasing power and promoting the euro's anchor-currcncy  role.
Sirnilarly, the depth and liquidity of the European finsncial market will facilitate
transactions on that market, thereby increasing the euro's attactivcness as an
investment asset and a reserve curency for central banls.
The development of the euro's international rolc should first show itself in the
counties which have close economic, trade and financial links wirh the
European  Union, such as the counrries of Central and Eastern Europe and some
Mediterranean  and Afiican.counties. For e:rample, the corrntics of Central and
Easteru  Europe which alrcady tie their currencies to thc mark will bc linked to the
ewo ipsafacto, and the private sector can bc expected to use the crrro in its trade and
financial relations with the Eumpean Union Similarly,  the euro will automatically
become the currency of reference for thc franc CFA zonel. At the world level, these
developmenc will be more gradual given the insrtia cffets that have prolonged  the
intemational  role of the dollar since the end of thc Brstton Woods system. The
widespread use of this cturency reduccs thc transaction and information costs linked
to its use.
Jhc CFA zone is made up of two s€parate monetary unions having thcir own respecrive single
currencics : rhe franc of rhc "CoopCration Financilrc Africainc"  in the Wcstem pan and the franc of
thc "Coopdnation Financilre Africaine"  in Cenual Africa. In this CFA zone, thc currency has a fixed
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Thc development  of the euro's intemationat  role and the deepening of European
financial markets arc likcly to be accompanied by a geater interaational  importance
of ECB actton. The moneury policy of the US Federal Resen'e currently influcnces
not only the conditions on US money and financial markets but also those on
intemational  financial markets as a rcsult of the mobilify of capital, arbitrage
between  markets, the depth and liquidity of the US financial market, and thc dollar's
iuternational role. European  monetary rrnification and financid integration, which
will iucrease the attractiveness  of eurc-denominated  asscts, will atso grve the ECB's
actionsan international dimension beyond that of the national ccntral banks today.
The intemationalization of the euro might initidly also complicate  the conduct of
domestic monetaf,y policy as the evolution of monetary aggr€gates will become more
dependent upon the decisions of foreign asset holders. Thus, a carcful examination
of the factors inlluencing monetary aggregates will be decisive in view of the
execution of monetary  policy.
The impact of the euro's introduction on the allocation of privarc portfolios  is
difficult to assess since it is hard to forecast the reaction of economic agents to a new
currency. In the long term, rhe facrors already identified will tend to increase the
attractiveness  of rhe euro. A diversification  of intemational portfolios away from the
dollar is already rurder way: between 1981 and 1995 European  curencies' share of
the world private portfolio incrcased from 13% to 37yo, while the dollar's share fell
from 670/o to approximarcly  40Yo (sec Annex 2, Table 4(b)). Similarly,  the
importance of Er,ropean currcncies is growing in intcrnationd  bond portfolios,  with
their share almost doubling to 37Yo bctwpcn 1981 and 1995 (see Anngrc 2,
Table 4(a)). The increased demand for euro assets is likely to bc accompanied  by an
increased supply of such assets. At prescnt, one of the reasons why issuers of
international bonds prefer the dollar for largc, iszues is that the cost of covering
exchange-rate  and interest-rate risks is lower with the dollar. Howgvctr, the grcatcr
liquidig and depth of the euro market might reduce  these costs to a levcl comparable
ro that of the dollar market, leading to an insrease, in the number of debt issues in
euros. This is all the more likely given that the currency composition  of the dcbt of
developing countries (Asi4 Latin America and eastem Europe) revcals . vglalivel/
low proportion of European currencies.
The use of the euro as a reseme currenLy should also dwelop. The diversificarion of
foreign-exchange reserves in favor.rr of the euro will be linked to its increased  use as
an instument of intcrvention  on foreign-exchange  markets and as an invoicing
currency in world trade. It will mainly depcnd on the euro intinsic qualities aud its
r:se in thc denomination  of intcrnational  financial tarnastions. This diversifrcation
of reserves in favour of the euro would continue a tcnd that is dready evident- Over
the period from 1973 to 1995, the yen's sharc of official reserves grcw from 0.lolo to
7 ,4.o/o md tlre mark's from 7/o to 14 .2o/o, whercas the dollar's sharc fcll ftom 7 6Vo to
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B. TRAI{SITIONALISSI.]ES
While the longer-term outlook for an intemationd  monetary scene with the cr:ro is
favounble,  rhere are a number of transitional  issues associated with the introduction
of the single currency. They refer to a potential risk cithcr of cxchangc-ratc
instability  between the euro and other major curencies, or of a deviation of rhe level
of rhe value of the euro away from what is considered appropriate. Although the
discussions focus mainly on the early months Of the existence of the euro,
anticipation behaviour by economic agents could already have implications for the
eachaigc rate in the period bcfore introducrion- Possible causes that have been cited
for this pnwanted exchange-rate  behaviow  include the perceivcd futtrre monetary
poticy stance of the ECB, the dollar overhang  in eental ba*s and the reshuffling of
private portfolios following  the inuoduction of the euro.
'Ihe monetary poticy stance in the early stages of the ECB has bcen a topic for
discussion  for somc timc now. An oftea heard argument is that the ECB would
attempt to esrablish early counter inflation crcdibility by adopting a tigbt monetary
polici sunce. Interest rates would thus be higher tban would otherwise be justified,
arrd would result in an inflow of capial and associated  upward Prcssurc on the
exchange rate. This could hampcr Europe's export competitivcness and economic
growth performance, whic[ accordiug to this line of argu$]ent' could encourage
European governrnents to compcnsatc with expon'ionary  fiscal policies' thereby
rcinforcing upward Prcssures on intercst ntes and the exchange rate.
Although  the ECB will be a new institutioq it will be at the centre of a system of
central banks of countries that havc demonstrated &eir commitment  to stable prices;
there is thus no reason to assulre that the Bank will not enjoy counter inllation
credibility from the outset. Moreovcr, thc sunrtory indepeodence of the ECB and its
legal obligation to pursue thc goal of pricc stability mean that there will be no need
for the ECB to demonstrate onse more to markcts what is already evident Aom rhe
start. lt also has to be recoqpiscd  that the economic performance of each of the EMU
members in terms of inflation fiurdamcnals  is bcttcr ttran in the past.
15. Budgetary policies on the other hand, altbough mainly decided at natiornl level, will
be set in the framework embedded in both tbe Maasticht Treaty and ia the Stability
and Growth Pact. As the Stabiliry and Crrowth Psct wiU guarantee budgetary rigour
in thc euro a$ea, there is no re:ubn to cxp€ct the monetarlr  policy stance, in rhe eady
st2gcs of EMU, to be too resrictive.The Eruopean policy mix in the transition  pcriod
is thus likely to be of the rigbt kind, and not likely to provoke a mismatch  on rhe
orchange ratc fiont.
f6- A frequently  me,ntioned cause for short-term  curency instability is the perccivcd
o"ui  ,ro"i of dollars - often dubbed the dollar overhang - accumulated in cotral
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aceoruf is taken of the decline in reserves  resulting from the conversion of holdings
of currencies of counties participating in EMU into domestic assas-2 The
European Union as a whole currently holds more Feserves than the Unitcd States or
Japan; these holdings might be considered disproportionatc  to the Union's needs
after the euro has been introduced, for two r€asons: the disappearancc of the Deed to
. stabilize  exchange rates between European currencies  (in an EMU of 15) for which
also dollars were held ?q a possible intervention currency; and the fact tbat the
proportion of  nade denominated  in  foreign cturencies will fall  bccause
intra-Community trade (more than 60%o of current external trade) will take placc in
euros.
Several qualifications need to be made. First, although  the absolutc value of the
amounts  involved may indeed be substantial,  they are not significant in view of the
nrnover in frnancial markets. Sccond, ccntral banl6 are fully aware of the potential
impact on exchange rates of their transactions;  it can thus be cxpected that operations
to reduce excessive  dollar holdings, if  any, \+'ill be done gradually, in close
cooperation and with an cye on market efrects.3 The European Central Bank may
also in the early 5tzges ofthe €uro's existence deem it appropriate to have a larger
stock of foreign reserves at its disposal if it wanted rc demonstate its capacity to
stabiliZe the euo exchange rate as part of its monetary  policy strategy.
17. The impact of the introduction  of the euro on private portfolio.  composition  is
difficult to assess. At the very liquid end, where castr or near cash is being held,
private economic agents will be confronted with a changed port'olio, with the
constituent parts of the euro being replaced by one single curency. This is an
entirely new situation and reactions will differ according to the reasons for which
monEy is being held. For example, traders within the euro area that previorsly kept
different European  currencies to diversiff their risk may bc faced with a surplus of
euros for traDsaction purposes. On the other hand, investors that were previously not
intErested in European currencies  because of the limited size of the money markets
may now want to acquire euros. The impact of the adjustment on the supply of and
dcmand for curos is thus not sraighdiorn'ard-
For financial assets with longer maturities the picture is wen less clear. Investors
will re-assess the risk-return  ratio of asscts currently in their portfolios thet arc to bc
converted into euos and are likely to shift thcir holdings accordingly. Also, the
increased liquidity and depth of financial markcs will itsclf makc euro-dcnominated
assets more attractive, thereby puning downward prcssure on thc intsrcst rate. Thesc
changes can occur fairly quickly and wen in anticipation of the creation of the euro;
whether ttris will lead to changes in the exchange rate or to increased  o<change-rate
A numbcr of snrdies, panicularly  rhosc carried out by invcstrnent banks, have arcirpad  to gandff rhis
surplus but rhcre is no conscnsur  as to its rcalc: ndrile somc rtudics argue that f;hcrc wil} bc no. suplus.
others take the view that it could be as high as USD200 billion.
There is atready close consultation  between $re Europcan centrel  banks on reserves transactiont during
the second sbge in order to avoid any ncgative cffec on drc forcigrcxchangc rnarkets.
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volatilig is hard to predict as the lir* bctween  asset sbifts, the demgnd for currency
and its exchange rate is not staightforward.
18. The above considemtions  suggest that in the aftermath of the inroduction of the
ewo, its exchangc rate might be affected by adjustnents  by cconomic agents- Some
will happen graduaily and in an orderly rtranner, such as lhe adjustment of central
bank resene holdings; others, in particular tbose related to port'olio adjustments,
could have a more direct impact in the short term. There will thus be a case for
monitoring  exchange-rate  developments  and, if neede{ for close international
cooperation to ensure that any unwarranted impact of transitioual effects on
exchange markets are minimized.
C.  EXCIIANGE.RATE  POLICY AND EXCHANGE RATE OF THE EURO
19. The Maastricht Treaty sets out a policy framework that is designed to ensure that the
Commr.rnity  is an area of econornic growth and stability. As from I January 1999, a
single monetary policy will be foimulated  by the European Cental Bank. The Bank
will be independent and its priority objective wiil b€ to safeguard price stability in
the euro area. Fiscal policies will be tlrc responsibility of Merrber Starcs but
budgetary discipline  will be guaranteed by market pressures,  by Treaty obligations  to
avoid orccssive deficits and an obligation to zubmit stability and growth
prograurmes  designed to mainain  a buCgetary situation close to balance or in surplus
in the medium term. The euro area will also pusue a single exchBnge-rate policy in
relation to third curencics. This policy wiU be formulated through procedures
involving the Corurcil, the ECB and the Cornsrission (Articlc 109 of thc EC Treaty).
Impect of econonic policies on the euro's erchange  rete
Exchange rates can be affected by many factors, some of which are inlluential in the
short term and others in the longcr tcrm. In the short tern, exchange rates can bc
influenced by instuments  employed for exchange-rate policy purposes. Such
instnrmena include sterilized or non-sterilized inewention by central banks on
foreign-excharrge markets and variations in official interest rates-
In the longer term, exchanrge rates are determined principalty by fundarnenal
economic factors. These factors include such variables as growt\ inflatioo
performance, productivity,  budget balances, cunent balances, and thc relative supply
of domcstic and foreign assets- Etgecutions as to changes in thcsc variables also
play a kcy role in exchange-rate  movernmts.  Thcsc firndaurcnal cconomic factors in
trrn clepend on tlre economis policy pnrsucd, the policy mix-
Tbe economic policy factors which wilt influcncc the cruo's cxchaoge  ratc fall into
two catcgories:  intemal and extcrnal. At the Eruopean lcvcl, the conditions for a
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ECB and a fiscal policy avoiding excessive deficits arc the basis upon which
monetary policy will maiutain stability and hencc sustainablc  grolvtll- In the
beginning, however, short term consideratioDs'may  impact on thc euro. Such effects
may become evident even before the third stage of EMU achnlly bcgins and may
inlluence the currencies  of likely euro ruea partieiparrts. fherefore, it is impcrative
that the pregataty work for the third stage ensures tbat the ECB can operate under
the conditions provided for in the Treaty. A balanced policy mix should lead to
susainably low long-term interest rates enabling easy monetary conditions at an
exchange rate which is appropriate  in view of economic  conditions.
22. Considering the economic prospects for the European  economy compared  to that of
the United States, different cyclical positions will impact on the stancc of relative
economic policies and thus on the exchange rate. Given the Union's objectives to
achieve both fiscal consolidation  and full emFloyment, ttris creates conditions for a
relatively  easy monetary  stance in the euso are,a- Given that fiscal policy is
commined to reducing the deficit towards closc to balance or surplus, monetary
policy would be able to conduct a fairly accommodative  policy without jeopardising
its primary objective of price stability.
Among the long-term consideradons,  the euro exchange 11ate will reflect the
fimctioning of EMU. ln particular, the challcnge of greater competition  must bc met
by appropriate structural policies. Greater labour market flexibility, ta:< and social
security reform in tbc direction of tbe most efrcient systems will help-the European
esonomy to adapt to global challenges. If tbcsc reforms wcre to continue, EMU
would conribute  to a structural reform which would uttimatcly havc a positive effect
on emplo;rment. 
;
23- In summary, the euro could evolve into an international  curency in an environment
of stability both internally and exrernally. In addition to these fastors, which are
influenced primarily by domestic economic policies, the euro exchange  rate would
also be influenced by external economic developments.
Exchangerate policy in thc euno areia
24- The reduced degree of openness of the eruo are4 its lcsser sensitivity to
exchange-rate  flucnrations  and the increased impact of its economic policy at world
level have occasionally been cited in support of the suggestion that thc euro arca
could adopt an aninrde of "benign neglect" towards the euro's exclrange rarc. But
such an attihrde would be at odds with Europc's cxperience of coordination. Ir
would s(pose it to the danger of ercessive  flrrctuationsr or even prolonged
misalignmcnts, irithe euro's exchange rate which could underminc  t$e viability of '
the global trading iystem. Pcriods of misalignrnents are frequcntly accompanied by
protectionist  Gmptations.  As the eruo is likely to become an internationgl  currency, '
it may also be vulnerable to mood swings which could affect its stability.
Furthermore,  pFEssure would probably be brought to bear to include occhangc-rate
considerations in the conduct of economic poficy- This pressure could stem from,
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sectors or regions which a$e more depcndent on the cxtra-Comnurdty  markpt for
their sales. The ECB, national govenrments  and Comrnmiry bodies will continue to
take sccorrrrt of the euf,o's exchange rate, the former primarily because it may affect
the price-stability objective and the lattcr because il  will inlluence  cosr-
competitivcness and thc grounh outlook for the European economy-
25- The implcmentation  of EMU is unlikcly to creatc grcatcr exctrang+rate instability in
the international  mouetary systcm. EMU should creatc an area of stability  at world
level, and there is not necessarily any conllict betwecn internal and o<ternal
objectives: the implemantation  of suicr internal policies will promote  inrernational
financial stability. The adoption of the curo should therefore be see,n as an
oppornrnity to put an end to the erratic fluctrrations and prolonged rnisalignments of
the tlpc that occurred bewccn 1980 and 1985 and to contribute to achieving more
srable international  monetary rclations. Thc EU's increased  influence on the
intemational monetary scene will also prnvide an opportuniry for a more intcnsc
economie dialogue with its partners.
26- Many types of exchange rate policy regiraes are possible,  ranging from thc adoption
of a fixed exchange-rate  system like at Brctton T/oods to managed or ftee floating.
In praclice, however,  tbere is no realion to exp€ct that the euro area would require
any change from thc current syst€rn ufiich seeks to conect marked misalignrreuts
and exccssivc exchange-rate  flucfirations  through a combination  of economic policy
.  dialogue, occasional use of intenrention and vcrbal cxchange-rate man€ernent.
However,  such a syst€m is not optimd and has to be improved.  The insrumc,ns and
means of doing so exist and should be snrdied more closely.
The iustitutional fremcwork
27. The Treat5r implicitly acknowledges  that exchange-rate policy is an imporrant
elemcnt of both monetary and economic policy and it provides thc stnrcture for
orgarrizing  thc dialogue ncccssary for resolving potcntial conflicts. Exchange-rate
policy will be defined in a franrework of close cooperation, rcspecting the objcctive
of price stability, betrveen the monetary authority  and the other Commrurity bodies.
The Treaty o€anises the exchange-rate policy in three levels:
-  the conclusion  of formal agr€emeotlr on an exchange+ate  system which wiII be the
resporuibility of the Courrcil; honrcver,  this requires a lecotruDendation from either
thc ECB or the Commission,  the ECB having to be consulted in an cndeavour to
reach a consensus consistent  with thc objective of price sability,
-  gencral orientations for exchange-rate policy which may, in the absence of an
orchange-rate systgtrl, be formulated  by the Council but have to be without
prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price stability, and
cAcANsoloJ  zL--Lo @ozs
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-  conduct of foreign exchange  operations (intcrrrentions, daily managemcut of
exchang,e resen es), for which the ECB will have sole resPonsibility.
The framework for close cooperation between the inonetary authority and tbe other
Community  bodies is esablished by Article 109.
28. Article I0g(I) sets out the procedurc for concluding formal agrcements. This
paragaph makes it clear that the decision to conclude a formd occhange-rate
agreement is the respoDsibiliry of tbc Council. The Cor.urcil has to decide
unanimously,  on a recomrnendation from the ECB or from the Commission, after
having consulted the ECB and thq European Parliament.  Consultation  between the -
Corurcil and the ECB is aimEd, in this case, at achieving a consersus  corsistent with
the objective of price stability.  There is however no requirement for the Council and
the ECB to agree: the obligation is only one of effort. From a purely formal
viewpoint, should the views of the Conncil aad the ECB diverge, those of thc fonner
would prevail. flqwever, a significant disagreement  seems r.rnlikely since the
Council is always bound to respect the objective of price stability for exchange-rate
policy.  a
The practical arrangements  for negotiation  and conclusion  are to be decided rrnder
the conditions  defined in paragraph 3: the ECB, or. the Cornrnissior5  could, for
instancc,  be mandatcd  by the Council to fulfrl a specific role in the negotiation  of (or
to negotiate) the agleement.
29. Article I09Q) enables the Council to issrc general orientations for cxchange-tate
policy in the absence  of a formal agreement of the type referred to in Arlicle t 09( I ).
These general orientations can tre decided by the Corurcil acting -tij' qualified
majority  on a resorurendation from the Commission and after consultiri:!  rhe ECB,
or on a recomrnendation  from the ECB.
As to the ECB, it would have to organize its operalions in a rvay consistent with
these orientations, which however  must not contravene the primary objective of price
stability, the ECB being enrusbd with tbe task of conducting  monetary and
exchange-rate policies with the view to respecting this objective.
30- Article 109(3) describes the procedure needed to define the arrangements for
negoriadng  and concluding agreemenr conceming  "monetarl/ or forcign-exchange
regime matt€rs". The inclusion  of monetary  rcgimc mattcrs takes accourt of thc fact
thar the Cornmunity (euro area) will have exclrrsive competenc€  for the negotiation
of such matters, as it has for foreign exchange regime mafiers according to Article
109(1).
Arrangements  defined according to Article 109(3) will havc to ensure that (i) the
c  In addition, article 3 4 paragraph  3 $arcs that acrivides of dre Member  Sates and rhe Conrnrmity
"shall cntail compliurcc  with thc following grriding p'rinciplcs:  stablc prices, sound public finances and
mgnetrD/ conditions and a sustainable balencc of payrnens".
@ozt




Commmiry er(Ptesses a single position; and thst (ii) the Commission is fully
assosiated with the negotiations. The anangerneots ar,e to be dccided by the Council,
acting by a qualified majority on a recorrmendation.from  the Commission  and after
consulting  the ECB. Agreements concluded according to Article 109(3) arc binding
on the institutions  of the Commrmity, on the ECB and on Membcr  Sates.
31. Article 109(4) lays down arangements  for deciding the com.mon position  and
rePresentation of the Community  at thc intemational  level when matrers of particular
relcvance to EMU are at issue. Article 109(4) thus covers issues of particular
relevance for EMU other than agreements  concaning mon€tary or exchaage-rate
regime mattcrs. According to Article 109(4), the represartation of the Comrnunity at
the iirtemational  level has to reflect the division of responsibilities between the
Member  States and the Community in cconomic nnd monetry matters. Howcvfi,
according to Article 109(5), without prejudice to Commrurity  competence  and
Commrurity agreemen$  as rcgards cconomic and monetary union, Member states
may negociate in intemational  bodics and conclude internationd agrecmenls.
32. ls accordance with Article 30 of the ESCB Statute, the national cental banks will
provide the ECB withforeign resene a.rsers. The ECB will have full powers to hold
and manage the foreign rescn/es tlrat are transferrcd  to it. ln accordance with Article
3l-2 of the ESCB Safirrc, all other opcrations in forcign rcserve assets remaining
with the narional central banks after tlrc transfers referred to in Article 30, and
Member States' tarsastions  with their foreign exchange working balanccs shall,
above a certain timit, be subject to approval W the ECB in order to ensurc
consistcncy with the exchange rarc and monetary policies of the Community.
D. ET'ROPE  AS A PARTI{ER AT INTERNATIONAL  LEVEL
33. Tbe completion of EMU has the potential to lead to an important evolution in thc
intemstional  monetary system. The single curEncy is being intoduced at a time
when the.intemational monetary system is already in a period of transition,  with the
dominzrnt position of the dollar giving way to a more multi-polar system. Such a
system is not inherently less stable than a unipolar system but, by definition,
apFopriate arangernents for co-operation between poles will be crtrcial to the
stability of the system.
The implementation of EMU will also Gnd to make the internatiosal  monetary
systcm more symmctrical with the potcntial gains to be obtained from coordinstion
tending to be more wriformly disuibuted among the various partners. Ettropean
economic  policies arc likely to have bigger spill+ver effects on the economies of
Europe's partncrs, while the rcmoval of the possibility of intra-EU  tensions  triggered
by intemational  cxchange-ratc moverncnts rcmovrs ollc source of EU nrlncrability
towards the outside world.
34. The direct implication  of EMU is that the EU will have a cingle.o(change rat and a
single monetary  policy, and that it will be the policy mix at European level that is
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rclerra$t for the resr of the world and for any int€rnational  ma€ro-economic  policy
coordioation. Although  part of this policy mix is the resrlt of policies set at the
*tio*t  level, the oUtigarion of the member States to closely coordiaarc their
economic policies (Articie 3a) and the different  procedures  set out in the Treaty to
accomplish this should enable the euro area to pursue consistent  polieies and prcvide
a valid reference point for intemational economic  affairs, both bilaterdly and in
international bodies.
This reality is reflected in the Maasfioht  Treaty, and in particular in Article 109 of
the EC Treary. This Article not only sets out intemal proccdures for the Commrrnity
to establish  an exchange-rate policy, as discussed  earlier, but also offers a framework
which will allow the EU to be an effective actor on the intemational stage on
macro-economic  and monetary issues. Although the Article is complex, therc are
several principd points:
-  it is clear that the EU, or the curo are4 must establish,  wiicre relevant, a corrrnon
pbsition for intemational discussion of "agreemeots coucerning  monetaly or
foreign-exchange regime matters" and on "issucs of particular  rclevance to
economic and monetary  union";
-  responsibility for rhese matters lies with the Council, although both the ECB and
thsCommission  have roles to play. The underlyrng intention of these provisions is
to make clear that the Cor.rncil and the ECB cooperate in this arca in a way that
recognizes ECB resporsibility for monetary policy and the Primary objective of
price stability;
-  the representation  of the Cornnurnity at inrcrnationsl  level is for decision by
rrrranimity, although it must respeot the alloeation of competences in the economic
and monetary union.
35. A substantial amount of work will still be required in order to establish suitable
arrangefirents wirhin this framework.  Thcse issues will need serious discussion both
within the Community, and with the Comrnunity's'parflters  in the relevant
iuternational  organizations, since the advent of EMU will also have implications for
how some,of these institutions  operate.
36. A staightforward  case concens the IMF, where the introduction of the single
r,ttt"o"y will trigger a substantiat  number of firndancntal and oPerational questions.
One example concerns the conccpt of a nationd balancc of payments,  and of a
balance-of-payments  need, which is of particular  relgvance given that thc IMF
Member Statesn right to draw on Fund resources is intimatcly rclated to this. Here,
the question for the Fund will be how this is gotng to be dedt with in the singlc
curency area, wherc the concept of a BoP need at Mernbcr Starc level in particular
becomes hard to define. Another e:<ample refers to the representation on the Board
of Governors and the Executive Board, where, depending  on thc zubjec! the Union's
need to respecr the Trcaty's rcquirements on position taking and represcnbtion will
have to bd reconciled with thi requirements embedded in the Fund's Articles of
Ag5eement.  Identification and discussion of all these issues is needed well in
@ozt
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advanc€ of Stage III to cnnuc no transitional  problems.  Similar qucstions will have
to be raised with respect to othcr instinrtions  or for4 such as the G-7, where issues
that fatl within Community competence arc also discrssed and whe,re o<isting
practice will have to be checked against consistency  with the Treaty.
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